Revenge Porn Lawyer New York

The phrase revenge porn is not statutory language in New York. The provision people mean when they use it is Penal Law § 245.15, whose official heading is unlawful dissemination or publication of an intimate image, and the wording of that heading carries weight. The section reaches publication as well as dissemination, so an accusation under it is not confined to sending a file to one recipient; putting an image where others can see it falls within the same provision. Section 245.15 is a class A misdemeanor, and it is built around what the accused intended rather than around the image standing by itself. The prosecution must establish intent to cause harm to the emotional, financial or physical welfare of another, intentional dissemination or publication of a still or video image showing intimate parts exposed or sexual conduct, that the depicted person is reasonably identifiable, and that the accused knew or should have known that the depicted person did not consent. Each of those is a separate element, and each is a separate point at which an accusation can fail to match what happened. Mr. Sris, Owner and Founder of Law Offices Of SRIS, P.C., and the firm’s Of Counsel attorneys defend these charges in New York. Request a consultation. The firm’s 24/7 phone intake accepts calls at (888) 437-7747.

What Penal Law § 245.15 Requires, Element by Element

The intent element is the center of the section. Section 245.15 requires intent to cause harm to the emotional, financial or physical welfare of another. An image that was disseminated carelessly, or in circumstances where that purpose is absent, is not the same allegation as one accompanied by the required intent, and the difference is not a matter of degree within a single offense.

The conduct element covers two routes, not one. The heading reads unlawful dissemination or publication of an intimate image, and the statute is written around intentional dissemination or publication. Sending material to a single person and posting material where an audience can reach it are both within the section. Reading the statute as limited to private sending understates its reach, and treating any onward movement of an image as sufficient overstates it, because the intent element applies to both routes.

The image element is defined by what the material shows: a still or video image showing intimate parts exposed or sexual conduct, “including an image created or altered by digitization.” That last clause matters in current practice, because material that was generated or modified rather than captured is addressed in the statutory text. Subdivision 2(d) of § 245.15 supplies the digitization definition that Penal Law §§ 263.11, 263.15 and 263.16 cross-reference, which is why the same concept appears in charges arising under Article 263.

The identification element requires that the depicted person be reasonably identifiable, and an image that does not meet that description does not satisfy the section.

The consent element is written as knowledge, actual or constructive: the accused knew or should have known that the depicted person did not consent to the dissemination or publication. What the depicted person consented to at the time an image was made and what that person consented to regarding its later distribution are separate questions, and the statute is concerned with the second.

The section also carries exceptions. They cover reporting unlawful conduct, law enforcement, legal and medical contexts, voluntary public exposure, and legitimate public purpose. Whether the alleged facts sit inside one of those exceptions is examined as part of the case rather than left to the end of it.

How Mr. Sris and the Firm’s Of Counsel Attorneys Handle These Cases

The first pass is a comparison between the accusation and the statutory text. Because § 245.15 has several independent elements, an accusation can describe conduct accurately and still not describe the offense. The review asks which element each factual allegation is meant to satisfy, and whether the allegations left over after that exercise cover every element or stop short of one.

The intent element receives separate attention. Intent to cause harm to the emotional, financial or physical welfare of another is a specific mental state, and an accusation frequently rests on inference drawn from surrounding circumstances rather than on any statement of purpose. Testing that inference against the full context, including what preceded the alleged dissemination or publication and what the parties understood about the material, is a defense function distinct from disputing that an image moved at all.

The consent and identification elements are examined next, since each can be dispositive on its own. Whether the depicted person is reasonably identifiable, and what the accused knew or had reason to know about consent to distribution, are questions with answers grounded in the record rather than in the label attached to the case.

The statutory exceptions are considered on their own terms. Reporting unlawful conduct, law enforcement, legal and medical contexts, voluntary public exposure, and legitimate public purpose each describe circumstances the legislature placed outside the section, and whether a client’s circumstances fall inside one of them is a question worth resolving early. Where the material is said to have been created or altered by digitization, subdivision 2(d) and the cross-references from Penal Law §§ 263.11, 263.15 and 263.16 are reviewed together. Mr. Sris and the firm’s Of Counsel attorneys then appear in the New York court where the matter is pending.

Mr. Sris and the Firm’s Of Counsel Attorneys

Mr. Sris is the Owner and Founder of the firm and is a former prosecutor. He is admitted in Virginia, Maryland, the District of Columbia, New Jersey, and New York. Having worked on the charging side of criminal matters informs how an accusation is read on the defense side: the emphasis falls on which element each allegation is offered to prove, and on what a record would need to contain before that element is established.

Matters are handled by Mr. Sris and the firm’s Of Counsel attorneys, who contract directly with the firm. The firm was founded in 1997 and has handled criminal defense matters since that year.

Charges under Penal Law § 245.15 often arrive attached to a description that has already circulated among family, employers, or an online audience, and the statutory question and the public description are rarely the same thing. What the section actually requires, what the accusation actually alleges, and what the exceptions cover are set out for the client in plain terms at the beginning, so that decisions about the case are made against the statute rather than against the phrase attached to it. Those points are addressed before any resolution is weighed. Request a consultation. Calls to (888) 437-7747 reach the firm’s 24/7 phone intake.

Frequently Asked Questions

Is revenge porn the name of the charge in New York?

No. The phrase is not statutory language. If you are charged, the accusatory instrument will name Penal Law § 245.15, unlawful dissemination or publication of an intimate image, which is a class A misdemeanor. The distinction is worth keeping in mind, because the popular phrase suggests a motive of revenge while the statute requires intent to cause harm to the emotional, financial or physical welfare of another, along with several further elements. Reading the section rather than the phrase is the only reliable way to know what the prosecution has undertaken to prove in your case.

Does the section apply if the image was never posted publicly?

It can. The section is written around intentional dissemination or publication, and the official heading names both. Sending an image directly to one person is within the statutory language, so an argument that nothing was posted online does not by itself answer the charge. The reverse also holds: posting is not required to be widespread before the section is engaged. What the section does require, in every route, are the intent, identification, and consent-knowledge elements, and those remain in issue however narrow or wide the distribution is said to have been.

What does intent to cause harm mean under this section?

The statute describes intent to cause harm to the emotional, financial or physical welfare of another. That is a purpose directed at the depicted person, not simply awareness that an image was shared or that sharing it was unwise. Because a prosecution rarely has a direct statement of purpose, the element is usually built from circumstances, and circumstances can support competing readings. Where an image moved for a reason unconnected to harming the depicted person, the element is the part of the case to examine first, since it is independent of whether dissemination or publication occurred.

What if the image was created or altered by digitization?

The statutory language reaches an image “including an image created or altered by digitization,” so material that was generated or modified rather than captured is addressed in the text of the section. Subdivision 2(d) supplies the digitization definition, and Penal Law §§ 263.11, 263.15 and 263.16 cross-reference that definition, which means the same concept can appear in an Article 263 case as well. The statute does not draw a line between an image captured by a camera and one produced in that way. If your matter involves altered or generated material, the definition and its cross-references are examined together rather than separately.

Are there circumstances the statute places outside the offense?

Yes. Section 245.15 carries exceptions covering the reporting of unlawful conduct, law enforcement, legal and medical contexts, voluntary public exposure, and legitimate public purpose. These are part of the statutory scheme rather than informal considerations, and whether the circumstances of your matter fall within one of them is a question to raise at the beginning rather than at the end. An accusation that overlooks an applicable exception is describing conduct the legislature chose to address separately, and identifying that early can change how the matter is approached. Request a consultation.

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This page provides general information and does not create an attorney-client relationship. Case results depend on a variety of factors unique to each case. Results may vary.

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