Distribution of Child Pornography Lawyer New York

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Distribution of Child Pornography Lawyer New York

Article 263 of the New York Penal Law separates the person who holds prohibited material from the person who moves it, and it grades the latter more severely. Penal Law § 263.15, promoting a sexual performance by a child, applies when a person, knowing the character and content, produces, directs or promotes any performance that includes sexual conduct by a child less than seventeen years of age. The section is graded a Class D felony. Distribution allegations in New York are ordinarily charged through the verb “promotes” in that list, and that single word shifts the case in ways a general summary of child pornography law tends to flatten. The age threshold is not the one governing possession, because § 263.15 reaches a child less than seventeen years of age while the possession sections, §§ 263.11 and 263.16, reach a child less than sixteen. The grade is not the same either, since those possession sections are Class E felonies. The current text of § 263.15 also extends to a performance “created or altered by digitization as defined in section 245.15 of this part.” A conviction under article 263 is a registrable sex offense under N.Y. Correction Law § 168-a(2)(a)(i). Law Offices Of SRIS, P.C. defends promoting counts in New York. Mr. Sris, Owner and Founder of Law Offices Of SRIS, P.C., is a former prosecutor. Request a consultation. Intake runs through the firm’s 24/7 phone intake at (888) 437-7747.

“Promotes” as the Operative Verb in Penal Law § 263.15

Penal Law § 263.15 names alternative courses of conduct: a person who produces, a person who directs, and a person who promotes a performance including sexual conduct by a child less than seventeen years of age. A distribution allegation rests on the promoting alternative. The count does not become a promoting count because material moved in some general sense; it becomes a promoting count because the People allege the accused promoted the performance within the meaning the Penal Law gives that verb. The statutory term carries its own definition elsewhere in the Penal Law, and this page does not restate it. What matters for a defense reading is that the verb charged sets the theory, and a record assembled around storage on a device is not the same record as one addressing the conduct the verb describes.

Grade follows the section rather than the verb. Producing, directing, and promoting all sit inside § 263.15, and the section is a Class D felony. Possession under § 263.16 and possession of an obscene performance under § 263.11 are Class E felonies. A promoting count therefore sits at a higher grade than a possession count arising from the same investigation, which is why the choice of section is often the most consequential line in an accusatory instrument.

Age follows the section as well, and this is where the article is most often misread. Penal Law § 263.15 describes a child less than seventeen years of age. The possession sections describe a child less than sixteen. A summary that assigns a single age to all of article 263 will be wrong about at least one section in any case charging both promoting and possession, and the error runs in both directions depending on which age the summary picked.

The current text of § 263.15 reaches a performance “created or altered by digitization as defined in section 245.15 of this part.” Penal Law § 245.15, unlawful dissemination or publication of an intimate image, is a Class A misdemeanor, and its subdivision 2(d) supplies the digitization definition that § 263.15 cross-references. No effective date or chapter for that language is stated here.

How Mr. Sris and the Firm’s Of Counsel Attorneys Handle These Cases

A promoting matter is read verb by verb before it is read fact by fact. Mr. Sris and the firm’s Of Counsel attorneys identify which of the alternatives in Penal Law § 263.15 a given count actually charges, because producing, directing, and promoting describe different roles and call for different proof even though they share a section, a grade, and an age threshold. A count that recites the full statutory list without identifying the alleged conduct is a count that has not yet told the defense what the case is.

The age alleged is checked against the section named. If a count cites § 263.15, the threshold is a child less than seventeen years of age. If a count cites § 263.11 or § 263.16, the threshold is a child less than sixteen. Cases that charge promoting and possession together carry both thresholds at once, and the counts should reflect that rather than adopting a single age throughout.

Knowledge is examined next. Penal Law § 263.15 requires that the accused knew the character and content of the performance. Allegations built on shared accounts, automated synchronization, or material moving through a device used by more than a single person put that requirement squarely at issue, and the question of who knew what is not answered by the presence of data.

Mr. Sris and the firm’s Of Counsel attorneys also examine the relationship among counts. Promoting counts frequently accompany possession counts drawn from the same materials, and each count still has to satisfy the section it names. Where digitized or altered material is alleged, the count is read against the definition cross-referenced from Penal Law § 245.15.

Registration consequences are part of the analysis from the beginning, because article 263 convictions are registrable sex offenses under N.Y. Correction Law § 168-a(2)(a)(i). Request a consultation.

Counsel at Law Offices Of SRIS, P.C.

Law Offices Of SRIS, P.C. was founded in 1997 and practices in criminal defense. Mr. Sris is admitted in Virginia, Maryland, the District of Columbia, New Jersey, and New York. Mr. Sris is a former prosecutor, and that background shapes how the firm approaches a charging document: which section a count rests on, what the drafter had to allege, and what the record behind the count actually shows.

New York promoting matters are handled by Mr. Sris and the firm’s Of Counsel attorneys. Staffing is assigned by matter, and the client is told who is responsible for the file. The firm does not name individual Of Counsel attorneys on practice pages; a client learns the assignment when the matter is opened.

Because a promoting count under Penal Law § 263.15 is graded above the possession sections and uses a different age threshold, the section named in the count drives much of the defense work. The firm reads those counts against the statutory text rather than against a general description of child pornography law, and it explains to the client where the counts differ from one another. A person charged under § 263.15 in New York can have the count examined element by element. Request a consultation.

Frequently Asked Questions

Why is a promoting count graded higher than a possession count?

The grade attaches to the section. Penal Law § 263.15, promoting a sexual performance by a child, is a Class D felony and covers a person who, knowing the character and content, produces, directs or promotes a performance including sexual conduct by a child less than seventeen years of age. Penal Law § 263.16 and Penal Law § 263.11, the possession sections, are Class E felonies. If your accusatory instrument contains counts under more than a single section, each count carries the grade of the section it names, and the difference is not cosmetic.

Does the age threshold change when the charge is promoting rather than possessing?

Yes. Penal Law § 263.15 describes sexual conduct by a child less than seventeen years of age. Penal Law § 263.11 and Penal Law § 263.16 describe sexual conduct by a child less than sixteen years of age. The article does not use a single age throughout, and that distinction matters when the age of a depicted person is contested. If you are comparing counts in a single case, read each one against the age written into the section it cites rather than against a figure carried over from another count.

Can promoting and possession counts arise from the same materials?

They can appear in the same accusatory instrument. Promoting under Penal Law § 263.15 and possession under Penal Law § 263.16 or § 263.11 describe different conduct, and an instrument may charge them together where the People allege facts fitting each. Each count still stands or falls on the section it names, with that section’s age threshold, its own elements, and its own grade. If you are facing both, the counts should not be treated as a single allegation, because a defense that reaches one theory does not necessarily reach the other.

How specific does a promoting count need to be about the conduct alleged?

Penal Law § 263.15 lists producing, directing, and promoting as alternatives. Reciting the whole list tells the defense which section applies but not which theory the People intend to prove, and those theories describe different roles. Mr. Sris and the firm’s Of Counsel attorneys press that question early, because the answer determines what evidence is relevant and what the knowledge element attaches to. If your count recites the statute without identifying the conduct alleged, that is a point to raise rather than to assume will be clarified later.

Does § 263.15 reach material altered by digitization?

The current text of Penal Law § 263.15 includes a performance “created or altered by digitization as defined in section 245.15 of this part.” Penal Law § 245.15, unlawful dissemination or publication of an intimate image, is a Class A misdemeanor, and its subdivision 2(d) supplies the digitization definition cross-referenced by the article 263 sections. That is the provision reaching altered and artificially generated imagery. This page does not assign a date or an amending chapter to the digitization language. Where such material is alleged, the count should be read together with the cross-referenced definition.

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This page provides general information and does not create an attorney-client relationship. Case results depend on a variety of factors unique to each case. Results may vary.

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Attorney advertising. This page is for general informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice, nor does it create an attorney-client relationship. Statutes and their application change and vary by case. Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome; results may vary. For advice about your specific situation, consult a licensed attorney. Attorney responsible for this advertising: Mr. Sris.